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Abstract 
 
 This study dissects with great acuteness some of the big questions on China-Africa 
relations in order to debunk burgeoning myths surrounding the nexus. It reviews a wealth of 
recent literature and presents the debate in three schools of thought. No substantial empirical 
evidence is found to back-up sinister prophesies of coming catastrophe from critics of the 
direction of China-Africa relations. In the mean, the relationship from an economic standpoint 
is promising and encouraging but more needs to be done regarding multilateral relations, 
improvement of institutions and sustainability of resources management. A number of positive 
signs suggest that China is heading toward the direction which would provide openings for a 
multipolar dialogue. While benefiting in the short-run, African governments have the capacity 
to tailor this relationship and address some socio-economic matters arising that may negatively 
affect the nexus in the long-term. Policy implications are discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The acceleration of growth and greater openness of the Chinese economy has led to it 
becoming increasingly important in the global economy, particularly in Africa. This rise of 
China has recently become an object of increasing global interest because of its significance for 
the international system and for strengthening South-South co-operation. Africa’s economic 
and political landscape is increasingly witnessing China’s growing footprint. The relations 
between China and Africa have gained significant momentum over the last decade
1
. From a 
plethora of perspectives, China’s engagement in Africa has renewed Africa’s geopolitical and 
economic importance. However, lots of myths are surrounding this relationship. There are 
many schools of thought: the pessimist or neocolonialist strand which labels the relations as 
asymmetrical and unstable (Clinton, 2011); optimists who are of the stance that, it is a 
tantalizing opportunity (Akomolafe, 2006; Asche &  Schüller, 2008; Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009; 
Freschi, 2010; Fantu & Cyril, 2010;  Renard, 2011; Diaw & Lessoua, 2013) while; some 
scholars are seeing a change in paradigm, stressing  that  a new Chinese model for economic 
growth contradicts the orthodoxy of strong institutions as prime instruments of growth (Tull, 
2006; Wang & Zheng, 2012). 
China’s increased engagement with Africa has really sparked a raging debate in 
development circles (Osei & Mubiru, 2010). On the one hand, those who believe that China’s 
rising demand for Africa’s natural resources has not only helped to re-establish Africa as a 
source of valuable commodities for the global market but also has helped to focus attention on 
why the continent still remains poor (Asche &  Schüller, 2008), as well as created new 
possibilities for breaking through the stubbornly high poverty rates in the continent (Asongu, 
                                                 
1
This debate has gained momentum with the July 19
th
 2012 pledge of 20 billion USD in credit for Africa over the 
next three years, in a push for closer ties and increased trade. President Hu Jintao made the announcement at 
Beijing with head of states from 50 African nations. The loan which will support infrastructure, agriculture and the 
development of small businesses is double the amount China pledged in the previous three year period in 2009. 
Since then, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner with trade between the two hitting a record high of  166 
billion USD in 2011 (See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18897451).  
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2013a, b).  On the other hand, some voices chant that, China’s increased engagement with 
Africa is no different from earlier ones which largely cast Africa as the supplier of cheap but 
abundant raw materials as well as a fertile ground for the sale of cheap manufactures (Biggeri 
& Sanfilippo, 2009). These latter voices for the most part (but not exclusively Western) also 
suggest that African countries engaging with the Chinese government (that limits political 
interference) have little incentive to improve African governance  (De Grauwe et al., 2012).  
This growing significance of China on the global scene has led to concerns in both 
developed and developing countries (Jenkins & Edwards, 2006; Wei & Wang, 2009; Biggeri & 
Sanfilippo, 2009; Fantu  & Cyril, 2010; Zhu, 2010; Ji, 2010; Wang & Zheng, 2010; Renard, 
2011; De Grauwe et al., 2012; Diaw & Lessoua, 2013). According to Jenkins & Edwards, the 
impact of China, particularly on other countries in Asia and more recently on Latin America 
has been a focus of attention, but up to now there has been very little work dedicated to the 
impact on African countries, despite the fact that trade between the “Asian Drivers” and Africa 
has grown significantly since 1990 and that in the last few years, China has also emerged as a 
significant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. The present study seeks to 
fill this gap by providing a threefold contribution to the literature. Firstly, we complement 
existing literature by debunking some myths that may loom large and significantly influence 
policy decision making. Secondly, we put some structure on various strands of the debate by 
categorizing them into schools to thought. Thirdly, relevant policy implications resulting from 
the facts assessed and myths debunked are discussed. Specifically, we shall attempt to debunk 
the following myths: inter alia, China targets aid to African states with abundant natural 
resources and bad governments, Chinese do not hire Africans to work on their projects, 
Chinese workers and managers live in extremely simple conditions as compared to Western 
advisors, China outbids other companies by flouting social and environmental standards and, 
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low linkage levels between Chinese and local businesses (Freschi, 2010; De Grauwe et al., 
2012).  
 The rest of the study is organized as follows. China’s role in the global economy and its 
relations with Africa in terms of myths and schools of thought are covered in Section 2.  The 
myths are assessed in Section 3.  We conclude with Section 4.  
 
2.  China in the global economy, its relations with Africa and resulting myths  
 
2.1 China in the global economy and its relations with Africa 
In recent years, the accelerated growth and greater openness of the Chinese economy 
has led to it becoming increasingly an important player in the global economy. Almost one of 
every five people in the world today live in China. Since 1990, the economy has grown almost 
at the rate of 10% per annum (Jenkins & Edwards, 2006). As shown by Jenkins & Edwards, 
between 1990 and 2002 trade as a share of GDP increased by more than two-thirds for China. 
Although its share of world output and trade still lag behind its share of population, it has 
nonetheless increased significantly. The growing significance of this developing giant on the 
global scene has raised concerns in both developed and developing countries. In the case of the 
latter, the impact of China particularly on other countries in Asia and more recently in Latin 
America has been the focus of attention (Lall et al., 2005; Moreira, 2007; Wei & Wang, 2009; 
Wang & Zheng, 2010; Ortmann, 2012). African oriented studies have escaped research 
attention in spite of the fact that trade between China and Africa has grown significantly since 
the 1990s and in the last few years, China has also emerged as a significant source of FDI 
(Jenkins & Edwards, 2006; Fantu & Cyril, 2010; Diaw & Lessoua, 2013). 
China’s growing involvement in Africa has attracted substantial popular and media 
interest recently (Carmody, 2008). While, China’s march into Africa has often been welcomed 
with fear and disapproval from the West (Mawdsley, 2008), African commentators have tended 
to be more positive (Akomolafe, 2006). There is also an extensive and growing literature on the 
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nature of China and other Asian countries’ increasing involvement in Africa (Alden et al., 
2008; Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Guerroro & Manji, 2008; Goldtstein et al., 2006; Kitissou, 
2007; Naidu, 2008; Carmody, 2008). More so, important conceptual frameworks have been 
developed to investigate the impact of the large fast growing “Asian driver” economies of 
China and India on sub-Saharan Africa via, inter alia, channels of trade, investment and 
governance (Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008; Carmody, 2008). 
 The growth in trade relations between Africa and China slowed in the first half of the 
1990s. In the second half of the decade however (particularly in 1998), this growth accelerated 
(Jenkins & Edwards, 2006). According to Asche & Schüller (2008), even if the level is still low 
compared with the Western industrialized countries, foreign trade between China and Africa 
has been developing at an unprecedented headlong speed since the end of the 1990s
2
.  
Consistent with De Grauwe et al.  (2012, p.15), China’s shares in Africa’s trade have soared 
dramatically from less than 1% in the 1980s to about 11% and 13% in 2009 respectively for 
Africa’s export and import of commodities. They further posit that China now accounts for 
more than any individual European country in Africa’s trade.  
 Several studies have attempted to understand China’s move to Africa. Tull (2006) has 
stressed that China’s Africa interest is part of a recently more active international strategy 
based on multipolarity and non-intervention. According to the narrative, increased investment, 
debt cancellation and a boom in Chinese-African trade (with a strategic Chinese focus) on oil 
have proven naturally advantageous for China and African state elites. Biggeri & Sanfilippo 
(2009) examine the relationship and conclude that the Chinese move into African is driven by 
strategic interaction among three main channels (FDI, trade and economic cooperation) as well 
as by pull factors (natural resources and market potential). Fantu & Cyril (2010) have 
established that the relationship is mutually beneficial in the short-term and proposed critical 
                                                 
2
 Starting from a relatively low volume of  $5.5 billion in 1998, the value of foreign trade had grown almost 
tenfold by 2006, to $55.3 billion (IMF 2007; China Commerce Yearbook 2007). China has also registered a deficit 
in trade with Africa, which rose from $1.9 billion in 2004 to $2.2 billion in 2006.  
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interventions that African governments must undertake in order to negotiate with China for a 
stronger and more informed platform. De Grauwe et al. (2012) have stressed after an empirical 
investigation that China is consistently willing to import more from African countries with 
lower governance standing. Hence, filling a gap left open by the other major world economies 
which might play a key role in the future development of Africa. In the same line of thought, 
Renard (2011) had earlier concluded that while the benefits have been mutually beneficial, the 
improvement of institutions is needed to reap more benefits. Kolstad & Wiig (2011) have 
investigated Chinese FDI in Africa and found that these (FDIs) are resources-driven. They have 
further stressed that weak institutions appear to be the name of the investment game in Africa:  
that account only for 1% of global FDI flows (Asongu, 2012) and in dire need of foreign 
investment (Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012). However, Diaw & Lessoua (2013) have concluded 
that the CEMAC
3
-China trade relations have diversified openness and mitigated the negative 
incidence of trade on growth in the region.  
 The above studies leave room for one main improvement: there is lack of a study that 
puts some dialectical structure on the existing literature on in order to assess existing myths 
resulting from the ongoing debate
4
 on China-Africa relations. Accordingly, we steer clear of 
existing literature by first classifying the debate into schools of thought before examining the 
myths in light of the debate and existing literature.  
2.2 The schools of thought and stylized debate  
 As far as we have reviewed, schools of thoughts surrounding the myths of China-Africa 
relations could be classified in three main strands: the neocolonialist, the balanced-development 
and the accommodating schools.  
                                                 
3
 Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States.  
4
 For instance, Mawdsley (2008) has tackled the debate by exploring how the UK broadsheet newspapers represent 
China’s complex relations in Africa and in so doing, how they reflect on the West’s own role (s) in Africa. The 
paper which concludes by debating the importance of these media images at a time when China’s rise is being 
anxiously observed by the Western public and policy communities has one particular shortcoming: it is limited to 
the incidence of British media and hence, presents a one sided view and narrow perspective of the debate.  
 
8 
 
2.2.1 The Neocolonialist School 
 The first stand on the neocolonialist school is led by the Western World and skeptics of 
the China model
5
. According to this school, since China does not attach good governance 
conditions on FDI, trade and aid, its relationship with Africa is purely profit-making and not 
always in the interest of the host countries. The USA African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA)
6
 is an example of the Western model. According to the former USA Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton, US efforts in Africa are beyond simple profit-making; aimed at trying to 
establish better governance and generally make Africa a better place. She affirms the USA 
view is that: over the long run, investments in Africa should be sustainable and for the benefit 
of the African people. The Neocolonialist school’s view of Chinese intervention in Africa can 
be summarized in the words of USA Secretary of State: “Well, our view is that over the long 
run, investments in Africa should be sustainable and for the benefit of the African people. It is 
easy – and we saw that during colonial times – it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, 
pay off leaders, and leave. And when you leave, you don’t leave much behind for the people 
who are there. You don’t improve the standard of living. You don’t create a ladder of 
opportunity. We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa. We want, when people come to 
Africa and make investments, we want them to do well, but we also want them to do good. We 
don’t want them to undermine good governance. We don’t want them to basically deal with just 
the top elites and, frankly, too often pay for their concessions or their opportunities to invest” 
(Clinton, 2011).  
Freschi (2010) summarizes the concerns of this school by classifying myths surrounding 
the China-African relations into three main strands: China targeting African states with 
                                                 
5
Though criticized in certain circles (Huang, 2010), the  Chinese model of development which favors prudence in 
market opening and maintains state regulation, has been increasingly recognized as a better alternative in the 21
st
 
century to the Washington Consensus which champions free trade. This new form of development emphasizes 
prudence in market reforms and national sovereignty (Nijs, 2008). 
6
 The AGOA offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and 
build free markets.  
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abundant natural resources; the Chinese not hiring African workers and; China outbidding other 
companies by flouting social and environment standards (De Grauwe et al., 2012). 
 
2.2.2 The Balanced-Development School 
 The second school views the relations under consideration as a balanced-development 
approach (Fantu & Cyril, 2010). Accordingly, some analysts are of the stance that Chinese help 
is without conditions and this is different from the approach of Western powers that try to 
‘boss’ or patronize African nations (Tull, 2006). According to them, it appears that 
“colonialism” is too strong a term to describe the Sino-African relations. Looking at the other 
way round, “investment with no concern for the impact on the host country” (as the 
Neocolonialist school advocates) is not different from “using trade and investment as a tool to 
influence how a foreign country is governed”. The latter policy employed by Western nations is 
just another version of neocolonialism according to this strand (Tull, 2006).  
 If neocolonialism is characterized by unequal economic relations that damage the 
development potential of the less powerful state, this is not uniformly the case of relations 
between China and African states. Strong domestic institutions and transparency are 
fundamental to the use of Chinese credit and investment for development objectives (Renard, 
2011). Chinese companies have proven themselves willing to conduct business within the 
confines of the norm of standards of practice within a state, though these must be effectively 
enforced (Asche & Schüller, 2008). In order to ensure the resolution of any grievances which 
may arise in society relating to foreign capital, ownership and competition, there must be a 
legitimate institutional channel via which these can be made salient in the policies of the 
country (state).  Many analysts support the fact that, China-Africa business relations seek to 
align capital investment and diplomatic relations with the requirements of transparency and 
institutional oversight, enforcement of environmental and labor regulations and, the balance 
between the needs of domestic labor and the requirements of foreign investment (Asche &  
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Schüller, 2008). According to Menell (2010), an interview of diplomatic and other relations 
between China and Africa suggests the potential for mutual development. However, some 
(Western) commentators still regard China’s accelerating engagement on the continent with 
suspicion, fearing that relations between two such drastically unequal economies could 
perpetuate some form of dependence. 
 Another version of this school is the radical stance of Akomolafe (2006) who 
admonishes African policy makers to stop listening to the West. According to this version of 
the strand, China’s rapid economic transformation holds special lessons for those in Africa 
because, both China and most of Africa were in the same economic badlands in the 1970s and 
the 1980s. However, while the Chinese opted for an indigenous solution to their economic 
backwardness, African governments took to follow the prescriptions of the World Bank (WB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These Western dominated organizations 
prescribed the vile Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which later metamorphosed into 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programes (ESAPs), which in-turn ultimately 
metamorphosed into the insulting Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) programmes. The 
results, which could not be more contrasting, are self-evident. While African economies which 
devoutly followed the IMF/World Bank’s prescriptions have been devastated, China’s 
economy (managed by Chinese themselves) is surging with unprecedented breathtaking pace.  
 This school is best characterized by the Beijing Consensus according to Annette Nijs, 
former Dutch cabinet junior minister:  “The West are used to telling African countries that if 
you are liberalized, privatized and become more democratic, we will help you. But China treats 
African countries as equal partners -- the partnership rather than conditional relationship…. 
More and more economists, including me, are considering the Beijing Consensus a better 
model in this century than the Washington model.  …People sometimes make the mistakes that 
modernization equals Westernization. It's not the case. We cannot force the Western model on 
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anything in the world.  ….China's rise lies on the changing of geo-economy which is tilting 
towards the East, not the financial crisis in western countries” (Nijs, 2008). Accordingly, we 
could parallel the Chinese foreign policy to the New Partnership of Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), since the NEPAD and the African Union (AU) largely match Chinese-Africa policy 
understanding of African ownership.  
 
2.2.3 The Accommodation School  
 Some analysts are of the view that, though China may have neocolonial ambitions, 
options or alternatives are not available or limited (De Grauwe et al., 2012). Two questions 
clearly position this accommodating strand; (1) Are Western powers less neocolonialists? (2) 
Are there other alternatives to China and Western powers? 
 To fully understand this strand, it is interesting to take stock of Western policies prior to 
China’s engagement. Few, if any of the plans advocated by the US/EU controlled International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) or trade agreements have led to development in the African 
continent (Bartels et al., 2009), despite them being good students.  Culture has been blamed, 
but many East Asian countries that developed well were not subservient to the IFIs ideology 
(Akomolafe, 2006). More so, internationally imposed rules by the IMF and World Bank allow 
any players to come in and rape the African continent (Chinese or the developed world alike). 
Hence, the Chinese and others are just applying the rules set by the rich countries.  
 Historically, the link between free trade/market and democracy has shown that changes 
in productive structures largely led to more progressive chances in governance. While, not 
arguing democracy, what is quite new about these kinds of mantras (free markets and freedom) 
is that, one can have political democracy without a substantial change in the productive 
structure (Akomolafe, 2006). With regard to this perspective, one thing is constant in Africa, a 
backward productive structure increasingly primitivised and a larger external flow of resources 
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than inflows, which by substance and definition creates theoretical unfavorable conditions for 
free trade
7
. 
According to Menell, the accommodation of China as a foreign partner is clearly 
elucidated by the Angolan case. In 2005, Angola was disqualified for loans by IFIs because of 
poor governance and unhealthy institutions. Trade with China was an attractive alternative for 
revenue for the much needed reconstruction of the post-war economy. China’s relationship 
with Angola was seen by Western financial institutions as unlikely to promote transparency, 
because, tendencies of Chinese relations in Africa were strictly bilateral, Chinese corporations 
were secretive and, China’s policy is non-conditional. China approaches Africa with a policy of 
non-conditionality, which is welcomed as an alternative to perceived Western legacies of 
neocolonial influence; but this policy does however undermine international censure of 
despotic political regimes. China cannot be blamed for pursuing its own economic interests, but 
its quest for resources and market-thirsty industries hold the potential either to create 
devastating dependency or provide the stimulus for development (Menell, 2010). Menell’s 
position has been broadly confirmed by De Grauwe et al. (2012) as China is consistently 
willing to import from African countries with a lower governance standing. 
In this school, Tull (2006) has stressed that China has presented an attractive alternative 
to conditional Western aid and gained a valuable diplomatic support to defend its international 
interest. However, a general asymmetrical relationship differing little from previous Africa-
Western patterns, alongside support of authoritarian governments at the cost of human rights 
make the politico-economic consequences of increased Chinese involvement in Africa mixed at 
best.  
Though, some tendencies of China’s engagement in African are reminiscent of   
neocolonialism, whether this engagement is detrimental to development is in a large measure 
                                                 
7
 Some analysts even suggest that Africa’s economic performance has only recently recovered from the IFIs 
imposed structural adjustments to its 1980s levels (Akomolafe, 2006).  
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determined by domestic conditions in African governments. Where governments are corrupt, 
non-conditionality compounds the issue. Where domestic industries are uncompetitive, Chinese 
exports may curtail or skew development and, investment is accompanied with repatriation of 
profits. Where economies are unevenly developed in favor of mineral exportation, Chinese 
demand and investment can substantially exaggerate the inequality. However, where African 
governments possess a significant degree of legitimacy, a variety of domestic industries are 
developed, domestic capital is to some degree competitive, and labor is organized, the growth 
in Chinese investment, aid, unconditional loans and trade can prove substantially beneficial to 
comprehensive development  (Renard, 2011).  
 
3. Assessing the Myths  
 
3.1 Debunking the myths: opportunities and risks for Africa 
 
According to Asche & Schüller (2008), there are still hardly reliable data and only few 
empirical investigations have addressed the two principal concerns surrounding recent 
improvements in Sino-African relations. On the one hand, the central question of whether 
China is effectively contributing to sustainable development in Africa and; on the other hand, 
whether China’s primary concerns are to gain access to Africa’s raw materials and to open-up 
new markets. An investigation from the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and 
Development has probed into these concerns and used the latest data and information as a basis 
for analyzing the economic, social and environmental impacts resulting from the current 
Chinese engagements in Africa. Much to the surprise of many, the authors conclude that China 
is making important contributions to the expansion of infrastructure, to tapping of hitherto 
unexplored resources and to integrating African economies more effectively into global value 
chains (Asche & Schüller, 2008). However, the most critical issue remains compliance with 
international environmental and social standards by Chinese companies operating in the 
continent. Some evidence nonetheless suggest that Chinese firms are involved in the illegal 
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export of tropical timber from Africa and hence, playing a substantial role in the disappearance 
of forest area. Similar criticism applies to compliance with labor and social standards in 
Chinese production facilities in Africa, as evidenced from Chinese textiles factories in 
Mauritius and Chinese copper mines in Zambia. The conclusion of the report stresses that, 
empirically well-founded criticisms are needed to substantiate the claims of critics of Sino-
African relations and, recommends constant monitoring and analysis of Chinese companies’ 
business practices in Africa.  
   
3.1.1 China targets aid to African states with abundant natural resources and bad governments 
 
The stance of Asche & Schüller (2008) is fully shared by Freschi (2010) who has 
summarized the “myths and partial truths” surrounding China-African relations. On the view 
that China targets aid to African states with abundant natural resources and bad governments; 
with the exception of those that do not acknowledge the One-China policy, China gives money 
to almost every single country in sub-Saharan Africa. There is little evidence to suggest that 
China specifically targets countries with worse governance or gives more aid to countries with 
more natural resources. According to the author, China is not alone in its interest for natural 
resources in Africa and natural resources are not the primary motivating factor for Chinese aid. 
Like, many donor countries (the US included), China’s aid is motivated by a mix of political, 
commercial and social/ideological factors. While the myth on resources is sustained by Tull  
(2006) and Biggeri & Sanfilippo (2009) from oil and natural resources perspectives 
respectively,  Diaw & Lessoua (2013) have recently shown that the CEMAC-China relation has 
diversified trade and mitigated the negative openness-growth nexus based on natural resources. 
Kamwanga & Koyi (2009) have debunked existing myths of Chinese-Zambian relations 
in a two-point assessment. Firstly, on the notion that Chinese investments are primarily 
resource-seeking, the Chinese firms do not seem to be strictly driven by profit-motives but 
rather by long-term objectives. An eloquent example is the acquisition of mines closed by other 
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investors in the wake of the Financial Crunch. Secondly, on the claim that Chinese motives are 
driven by more purely economic considerations, Western donors have historically come from 
private owned corporations which are focused on profit maximization (generally with relatively 
short-term horizons). Conversely, recent Chinese FDI comes from firms, which are either 
wholly or partially state-owned or driven by broader objectives than mere profit maximization. 
 There is however some consensus among policy makers that the reaping of full benefits 
from Chinese trade and investment relations will require substantial improvements in 
governance in African economies (Renard, 2011, p. 1).  China has served as a development 
partner for Africa and an alternative source of trade and finance from Africa’s traditional 
development partners. Renard has concluded by stressing that though the impact of China on 
African economies has been diverse depending in part on the sectoral composition of each 
country’s production, overall China’s increased engagement with Africa could generate 
important gains for African economies. 
 From a general standpoint, the structure of Chinese FDI appears to be different from 
that of Western countries, that mostly involve private investors with notable limits to their risk 
appetite and which are often not committed to long-term presence on the continent (Besada et 
al., 2008). Conversely, Chinese investments trends today suggest the intention of establishing a 
long-run relationship (at least with governments). Osei & Mubiru (2010) sustain that China’s 
trade does not seem to be geared towards a purely African strategy.  Its main features are in line 
with China’s general policy that is aimed at lessening its energy and other natural resource 
constraints and increasing outlets for its manufactured products. Consistent with Menell (2010), 
China cannot be blamed for pursuing its own economic interest, but its quest for resources and 
market-thirsty industries hold the potential either to create devastating dependency or provide 
the stimulus for development. In the same vein, China cannot also not be blamed for trading 
with African countries with a lower governance because by so doing they are filling a gap 
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opened by other world economies which could result in the future development of the continent 
(De Grauwe et al., 2012). Too much emphasis on the quality of institutions by the West is not 
different from the USA experience in the early years of industrialization where market 
competitions were so intense that frauds and fakes were could be seen everywhere.  
In critical descriptions of China-Africa policy, three countries are regularly discussed: 
Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Through money and military assistance, China undermines 
Western and UN sanctions and efforts towards good governance, human rights and resource 
transparency. In Angola, the Western strategy of sending-in the IMF for public financial 
management and extractive industries transparency while French and US oil companies 
continue to operate unhindered, did not prove successful. Some critics are of the opinion that, 
the Angolan government had good reasons to reject wide-ranging cooperation with the IMF, as 
the IMF linked stabilization measures had far reaching highly controversial demands for 
privatization and deregulation (Asche &  Schüller, 2008).  Though in Sudan, China’s huge 
involvement in oil and infrastructure may have been the precise opposite of its declared policy 
of non-intervention (Askouri, 2007),  some sources state that, China’s role in consolidating the 
peace process in Southern Sudan through its participation in the United Nations Missions in 
Sudan (UNMIS) is actually rather constructive. Hence, in the Darfur conflict, China was 
obliged for the first time to tolerate a UN resolution that deviated from its non-intervention 
policy. She also supported a move in the Security Council to create the mixed UN-AU 
peacekeeping force. In Zimbabwe, in spite of Western sanctions, China signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on greater cooperation in all domains (Asche &  Schüller, 2008). But today, 
with some of the international sanctions being lifted on the Mugabe government, China is 
certainly no regretting its collaboration with Harare because the regime-change based sanctions 
may not have had the Western-desired effects.  
 
 
17 
 
3.1.2 Chinese do not hire Africans to work on their projects 
 
Consistent with Kamwanga & Koyi (2009) on the perspective that Chinese do not hire 
Africans to work on their projects; this depends on how long a company has been working in 
the continent and how easy it is to find appropriate local labor. Ultimately, it is also contingent 
on African governments themselves, who have the leverage and power to dictate what 
proportion of project-staff must be local (as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola 
have done).  
The impact of Chinese investment on domestic competition, income and jobs are also 
noteworthy. Assessing the competitive effects of Chinese FDI in Africa presents a particular 
methodological concern: quite apart from the widely diverging statistics on the scope of the 
investment. From a general standpoint, FDI can strengthen competition in domestic markets or, 
alternatively, displace local providers and dominate the market, therefore reducing competition 
(UNCTAD, 2005). The incidence on incomes and jobs depends on a particular combination of 
circumstances in each country.  
In terms of the impact on poverty, it is very difficult to provide a comprehensive 
assessment.  To establish with certainty whether the proportion of above-average growth over 
recent years in Africa that can be attributed to China has indeed been a form of pro-poor 
growth, three dimensions are necessary: in terms of the absolute definition of pro-poor growth, 
it has probably been;  with respect to the relative definition of pro-poor growth, which also 
includes distribution effects, the situation is unclear; and, as a consequence of strategically 
designed public policy of African authorities, (that is, in terms of the economic policy 
definition of pro-poor growth) it is certainly not (Asche &  Schüller (2008).  
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3.1.3 Chinese workers and managers live in extremely simple conditions as compared to 
Western advisors  
This myth has been debunked with suggestions that, while Western experts may be 
fewer, they cost their projects a lot more. The Chinese approach of combining business and 
political objectives in Zambia from the construction sector can best illustrate this point. The 
increased involvement of the Chinese in the road construction sector could be reflective of the 
competitiveness of Chinese firms which are reported to provide good quality projects at a price 
discount of 25-50% compared to foreign investors. In summary, the Chinese are able to be 
competitive favorably, on account of: lower profit margins; access to much cheaper capital; 
employment of low-paid staff; use of Chinese materials; limited attention to environmental impacts; 
access to hard currency premium paid by the Chinese government; and Chinese Government 
provided subsidies (Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009).  
 
3.1.4 China outbids other companies by flouting social and environmental standards  
 
 Consistent with Asche & Schüller (2008), on human rights and non-interference, 
dialogue on the former is a particularly difficult argument. Western countries are also 
repeatedly accused of inconsistency on human rights issues in Africa. Two core arguments can 
be distilled from a confusing and emotional debate as we outlined below. Western policy is 
likewise said not to have had advanced human rights and civil liberties in Africa for a long 
period of time. Historically this is difficult to deny.  Contemporary examples like Angola, 
Equatorial Guinea and Togo are eloquent testimonies. Prior to 1989, almost one and a half 
decades of uninterrupted Western hegemony on the continent did not prove the contrary. The 
support for pro-Western dictatorial regimes in the rivalry between competing systems before 
1989 confirms the need for Realpolitik. Before the 2010 Arab Spring, the support of African 
states with political morality was not a Golden Western objective. Even today, human rights 
issues in some oil rich Middle East countries have gone unnoticed by Western powers with 
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strategic interests in natural resources. The political classes in Africa are aware of these 
development and events.  According to this narrative, on the allegation that China outbids other 
companies by flouting social and environmental standards, China is portrayed as “on a steep 
learning curve”, struggling with environmental and corporate responsibility issues at home and 
abroad. It provides evidence that China and Chinese companies are becoming increasingly 
sensitive to international perception on these issues and may be inching towards international 
standards. 
 The view of the Chinese government is that, its partnership with Africa is one of equals 
with benefits for both sides. Plainly put, it is one of non-interference. China neither intervenes 
in the internal affairs of its partners nor applies conditionalities. The Chinese development 
cooperation in Africa receives high praises from the African side for its effectiveness and speed 
of implementation; a view considered by the Western World as reminiscent of the approaches 
and concepts of the 1970s (Asche & Schüller, 2008). African states, whether collectively or 
individually need to develop strategies of their own that underpin their cooperation with China 
and other emerging donor countries. Today, the Chinese government is expressing interest in 
strategic and technical know-how of western donors and implementing agencies. This could 
serve as a good platform for joint learning on how to provide more effective and better 
coordinated support for sustainable development in Africa. It is also interesting to note that, 
Chinese firms are generally less averse to risk than their Western counterparts. For instance, 
Chinese companies are not necessarily constrained by environmental and social safeguards 
(Kapinski & Morris, 2009).  
Accordingly, while the economic consequences have remained contradictory and 
situated between two poles: substantial job losses in some industries on the one hand and price 
reduction for African consumption on the other hand, the latter consequence is comparable with 
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the impact of importing second-hand clothing from Europe which could be regarded as an 
abuse to African dignity.   
  
3.1.5 Low linkage levels between Chinese and local businesses. 
 
The low linkage level between Chinese and local businesses could be compensated by 
one exceptional characteristic of Chinese FDI; that is, close link to the Chinese state. This 
starkly contradicts FDI from Western countries which is almost entirely driven by private 
enterprises. The level of investment has risen in tandem with foreign-aid and this close link is 
in accordance with the Chinese practice of incorporating aid as a sign of South-to-South 
cooperation (a practice which predates current Sino-African engagements). China’s increasing 
direct investment in manufacturing in Africa is predominantly via industrial parks or special 
economic zones (SEZs). This approach was formally initiated in 2006 when China committed 
to establish five zones across Africa. However, in 2007, it again committed to stretch the 
outreach to 10 zones. A number of projected zones have been announced and are currently at 
differing levels of development and expected to focus on value added industries (Edinger, 
2008). Though not a unanimous position among specialists, the special economic zones are 
expected to make substantial contributions to African industrialization which will more or less 
improve ties with local businesses. Moreover, there appears to be an increasing emphasis being 
placed on the private sector as well as on the small and medium size (SME) sectors such as, 
business services, manufactured goods and telecommunications (Kapinski & Morris, 2009).  
Since this myth has a local inclination, it is interesting to narrow the perspective to a 
country-specific dimension with the case of China-Zambia relations (Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009; 
Muneku & Koyi, 2008). According to the above literature, there are two main positive points. 
(1) Chinese investments have augmented collective resources inflows, augmented capital 
utilization, increased output and generated employment opportunities. The growth of copper 
production has been quite impressive and has led to corresponding growth in exports and 
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earnings. However, whereas, the imperative to acquire capital and newer technologies is well 
established, the Zambian population is youthful and marked by high unemployment. A caveat 
to capital and technological acquisition and, transfer is that, there must be a balance between 
the quest to acquire new technology and imperative to create new jobs. (2) It has been observed 
that, the Chinese trading investors have availed low priced and better quality products, which 
constitute and important welfare-effect. It could logically be argued that, where a reasonable 
proportion of the population is able to access such products, their welfare would be enhanced.  
It is also worthwhile to discuss the creation of sustainable agriculture and industrial 
sectors. In accordance with Asche & Schüller (2008), it is worth acknowledging that Chinese 
entrepreneurs are among the most dynamic in Africa (including in manufacturing industries). 
They make a substantial contribution towards integrating Africa into a number of global value 
chains (VCs), in the textile sector, in agriculture and fishing industries, among others.  
 
3.2 Policy implications and future directions   
Recommendations should be made in respect of: checking the risks of economic 
diversification, monitoring working conditions in Chinese firms, maximizing linkages with 
local suppliers, political ramifications of investments and, protection of indigenous small scale 
businesses.  
On implications for diversifications, governments should not lose sight of the need to 
diversify their economies. Strategies for directing more investment to non-traditional sectors 
such as Agricultural and Tourism ought to be improved.  
With regard to implications for media, the political dimension of Chinese economic 
interests should be carefully managed to avoid generalized adverse effects. Both local and 
international media have already engaged stories to this regard. Addressing the fundamental 
issues giving rise to such media coverage and negative propaganda would be helpful to both 
source and recipient countries.  
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There are also ramifications for disgruntled local business owners and employment 
opportunities for local workers. Given the limited employment opportunities from Chinese 
investments, it is imperative employment-creation strategies are stepped-up. Whereas, Chinese 
firms are contributing toward the creation of such jobs, limited linkages with local businesses 
curtail the positive effects.  Deliberate measures should also be undertaken to protect 
indigenous businesses that are unable to compete with Chinese firms and have to close down. 
Linked to this above point is the need to find ways of using Chinese international links to 
incorporate local firms into the international value chain, which will enable them to earn decent 
incomes from their economic activities. On the issue employment of local workers, African 
governments should follow the examples of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Angola that dictate what proportion of project-staff must be local. Monitoring of workplace 
practices is also critical as there have been reports about discontent over working conditions in 
Chinese owned firms.  
On implications for development cooperation, the expansion of Chinese aid to Africa 
merely reinforces a worldwide trend to broaden the provision of development finance and 
inputs. Low commercial lending rates present recipient nations with the opportunity to obtain 
low-cost alternatives to IMF/WB loans and offers of assistance from private foundations are 
increasing substantially. The almost irreversible fact that developing countries generally have 
more choice in the matter of who they want to corporate-with has several consequences. Firstly, 
OECD/G8
8
 donors are not able to meet their commitments to increases Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). This is causing them to lose more ground and credibility on the political 
front. References to increase in ODA through debt cancellation do not offer any political relief 
because the Chinese are also engaged in debt cancellations. Secondly, it is imperative to 
integrate “new” donors (China and private investment foundations…etc) into mechanisms of 
                                                 
8
 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Group of Eight Countries.  
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global aid accountability and corresponding processes in the recipient countries. However, 
these mechanisms have to be adapted in order to accommodate the highly pragmatic and result-
oriented mode of operations of the new actors. Thirdly, the reform of the conditionality for 
multilateral credits (currently a matter of dispute among management of the WB, the number of 
shareholders and international NGOs) must be completed. There is need for a consensus in the 
current deviation of IFIs policies. While the IMF and WB are accused of still attaching too 
many political conditions to their lending, the Chinese are reproached for precisely the 
opposite. 
As concerns the ramifications for economic policy options, Asche & Schüller (2008) 
have summarized the relationship between China and Africa in one simple formulation that 
appeared in the daily newspaper Nation in Nairobi: “China has an Africa policy. Africa doesn’t 
have a China policy” (12.6.2006). Gaye (2006) used a similar note in the title of his book: 
“China-Africa: The Dragon and the Ostrich”. What many analysts point-out is a glaring 
economic policy asymmetry: one country with a strategically planned industrial policy both 
within and without its own borders confronts 48 countries south of the Sahara which (apart 
from Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius) are unable to present any formulated policy that 
might attempt to link industrial, agricultural and foreign trade aspects. What most analysts 
agree with is that, the political preparation for such promotional policies is still very much in its 
infancy in Africa despite the obvious urgency. Presenting this issue for public debate would 
spark a process of rational political decision-making within countries on the one hand and 
within the African Union on the other hand. Hence, a common policy could emerge founded on 
rational economic arguments.  
It is also interesting to note implications for multilateral cooperation. The EU and the 
USA should intensify their search for opportunities (through the join EU-Africa strategy and 
AGOA respectively) to address issues of common interest in a three-way dialogue between 
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Africa, China and the West.  Though such trilateral political discussions are beginning to take 
place at the government, policy-advisory institutions, foundations and non-governmental 
organizations levels (e.g the EU Helsinki conference), much still needs to be done. For instance 
the new joint EU-Africa strategy (adopted in Lisbon at the end of 2007 which serves as basis 
for also improving the complementarity of trade policy, investment policy and development) 
could be improved with the following: regular invitations to China to participate in the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) processes, structure EU-China-Africa dialogue in 
accordance with the Helsinki agreement, sectoral NEPAD forums, transatlantic dialogue (G8) 
with the USA on critical dimensions of the US Africa policy with ramifications for China, 
governance in oil producing countries…etc.  
 An interesting further research direction in this debate could be to focus on country-
specific analyses. Owing to lack of relevant data, empirics on the debate are few; hence 
complementary empirical analysis on the subject matter would be a much welcomed 
contribution to existing literature. Such empirical dimensions of the debate could distinguish 
between short- and long-run effects. Event studies and industry-specific analyses would also 
provide new insights into the topic.  
 
4. Conclusion  
It is now a politico-economic fact that China’s emerging presence across Africa is part 
of a far reaching geopolitical shift towards a multipolar world which cannot be rolled back or 
neutralized by myths that proclaim sinister prophesies of coming catastrophe. The new Chinese 
model could offer an alternative to structural adjustment policies that have largely failed over 
the past three decades in the African continent. This study has examined some big questions in 
the Sino-African relations and found no substantial empirical evidence to back-up the claims of 
critics of the direction of China-Africa trade and investment relations. As for claims that cannot 
be easily empirically verified, the strand branding this relationship as “neocolonial” contradicts 
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itself by failing to acknowledge that, ‘conditional foreign-aid’ is just another version of 
“neocolonialism”. African governments have the capacity to tailor this relationship and address 
some socio-economic matters arising. On the employment of local workers, African states can 
follow the examples of the DRC and Angola that have dictated what proportion of project-staff 
must be local. 
From above analysis, China-Africa relations are promising and encouraging but more 
needs to be done regarding multilateral relations and sustainability of resources management. 
The more important China becomes an economic, political and development partner for Africa, 
the more the Chinese government and Chinese companies will have to face-up to pressing 
questions regarding the effectiveness of transparency, organization, safety and sustainability of 
the initiatives in Africa that other partners are already preoccupied with. A number of positive 
signs suggest that China is heading toward the direction which would provide openings for 
multipolar dialogue. Policy implications have been discussed.  
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